Why companies fail to respond to climate change:collective inaction as an outcome of barriers to interaction by Finke, Tobias et al.
1 
 
Why companies fail to respond to climate change: Collective 




, Alan Gilchrist, Stefanos Mouzas 
Department of Marketing, Lancaster University Management School, Lancaster LA1 4YX, United Kingdom 
 
Abstract 
The urgent need to combat climate change is now globally accepted. Collective action at a 
global level is the key ability to respond to the threat of climate change. No individual 
company alone has the necessary resources and capabilities to tackle the unprecedented 
challenge of climate change. Companies need to engage in give-and-take exchange 
relationships with other companies to address climate change.  Research on how companies 
interact with each of their counterparts to respond to the challenge of climate change is 
limited. Existing research on climate raises questions about 1) how companies interact in 
response to climate change and 2) why companies fail to craft collective responses to climate 
change?  In an attempt to shed light on these questions, we use the network approach as a 
theoretical perspective to account for the ever-increasing connectivity and interdependence in 
the business landscape and theorize on the consequences these phenomena may have for the 
study. The study is based upon an empirical investigation of public-private networks in 
Germany. Findings indicate that companies fail to collectively respond to climate change due 
to the multiplicity of interests of actors involved in the network which is aggravated by 1) 
economic reasoning; 2) weak actor bonds; and 3) differing perceptions of the rules of the 
game. As such, the present study contributes to our understanding of collective responses to 
the ever evolving challenge of climate change. 
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1. Introduction 
As climate change is now acknowledged as a global phenomenon (Oreskes, 2004; Meehl et 
al., 2007), there has been a corresponding call for action to be taken at the organizational 
level to mitigate the effects of this environmental challenge, as part of a wider scale plea for 
change to occur at governmental, individual firm and even individual level (Giddens, 2009). 
In this paper, we suggest that no individual company alone has the necessary resources and 
capabilities to tackle the unprecedented challenge of climate change (Veal and Mouzas, 
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2010). Companies thus need to engage in forms of collective action with other companies in 
in networks of exchange relationships (Easton and Håkansson, 1996; Gnyawali and 
Madhavan, 2001; Håkansson and Ford, 2002; Ritter, 2000), to address climate change 
(Brown, 1996; Pendergraft, 1998). In this study we investigate a case where this form of 
collective action, centered on responding to climate change, broke down and did not happen. 
We ask why and investigate the barriers to collective action in business networks. In doing so, 
we develop a theoretical framework to unveil the causes for failure of collective action 
centered on business network literature. Specifically, we concentrate on investigating and 
answering the following questions: 
1. How do companies interact in response to climate change? 
2. Why do companies fail to craft collective responses to climate change? 
To allow a thorough answer of these questions, we turn now to developing an understanding 
of where the current research has taken us to. 
 
2. Previous Research 
2.1 Business networks in the context of climate change 
In today’s business landscape, companies find themselves embedded in networks of exchange 
relationships driven by processes of continuous interaction between individually significant 
and interdependent actors (Easton and Håkansson, 1996; Gnyawali and Madhavan, 2001; 
Håkansson and Ford, 2002; Håkansson and Waluszewski, 2002, 2007; Ritter, 2000). These 
exchange relationships are entered when actors perceive that value can be created and 
captured (Mouzas and Ford, 2009). Conflict in these exchange relationships is inevitable, 
particularly when actors’ self-interests collide with collective interests of the organizations 
themselves, and of the wider societal groupings. The case of finding responses to climate 
change represents such a conflict. Self-interests, in this domain, are seen to motivate actors to 
free ride, where the best individual strategy may not result in a Pareto-optimal outcome 
(Nowak and Highfield, 2011). Common goods, such as a stable climate, are prone to contrary 
decision-making between self-interest and the best interest of the group. This is vividly 
demonstrated in the tragedy of commons, where individuals acting with self-interest 
independently behave contrary to the common good of all members, thus depleting common 
resources (Hardin, 1968). The tragedy of commons is inextricably linked with Olson’s (1965) 
logic of collective action which suggests that rational actors will place the goals of the wider 
group of society over and above their individual goals. 
However, there are difficulties inherent in engaging in collective action. Pendergraft (1998) 
argues for a link between a lack of collective action and the actual size of the collective. A 
similar congruence of thinking exists within the network literature where the interdependence 
of actors and the interactions between them is repeatedly highlighted as being increasingly 
problematic in direct relation to the size of the network and the number of actors involved 
(Ritter et al., 2004). Indeed, we argue that similarities can exist in terms of the barriers to 
both collective action and interaction such as scale, diversity of interest and the differing 
perspective of actors (Olson, 1982) which are inherent in larger collectives or networks. As 
Olson puts it: “in the absence of special arrangements or circumstances […] large groups, at 




Pertinent to this study and our focus on climate change, previous research on collective action 
suggests that disagreement among individuals may occur because of the scarcity of resources 
and the basic human belief of a fixed-resource pie (Veal and Mouzas, 2010; Bazerman et al., 
1999). It is recognized that climate change represents such a case, since actors are not able to 
enlarge the planet and its resources are limited (Hardin, 1968). Here, we suggest that 
collective action is one possible outcome of business interaction. However, as we 
demonstrate in this paper conversely this may not always be the case. 
Consequently, even the most ambitious climate change treaties have achieved very little, and, 
even more worryingly the increasing greenhouse gas emissions in the atmosphere continue to 
impose serious threats on natural, human and economic systems around the world, and would 
need to be reduced substantially over the coming years to stop climate disruption (IPCC, 
2014; Stern, 2006). 
It is important to consider some technical aspects of climate change in order to allow for a 
reliable investigation of interactions in response to climate change. Veal and Mouzas (2010) 
summarize the issue of climate change based on the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change Synthesis Report (IPCC, 2001) as following: 
The Earth’s climate system has demonstrably changed since the pre-industrial era. Human activities have 
increased the atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases and aerosols. An increasing body of 
observations gives a collective picture of a warming world and other changes in the climate system (Veal 
and Mouzas, 2010, p.423). 
A broad consensus about climate change science, i.e. that it is real and man-made, exists in 
the research community (Oreskes, 2004; Meehl et al., 2007; Veal and Mouzas, 2010). 
Furthermore, it is recognized that it is still feasible to stabilize CO2 concentrations at 
acceptable levels (IPCC, 2014) and that the costs and risks resulting from contemporary 
inaction significantly exceed the costs of immediate climate change mitigation (Stern, 2006). 
At the most basic level, responses to climate change can be either adaptation (responding) or 
mitigation (prevention). Both approaches are valid, since adaptation is necessary to handle 
changes that are already present and cannot be revoked, and mitigation is necessary to 
minimize long-term risks by stabilizing the atmospheric CO2 levels (Stern, 2006). Of 
significance in this study are two considerations of climate change, as suggested by Veal and 
Mouzas (2010): 
1. It requires collective actions in various areas embedded in the economy and everyday 
life of people 
2. Mounting a successful response is limited to a timeframe of 20 to 50 years due to the 
long atmospheric life span and cumulative nature of CO2, meaning that today’s 
decisions can affect global climate changes for up to 50 years (IPCC, 2001) 
We view these considerations in relation to climate change as being structural and physical 
constraints which are important contextual factors when investigating the barriers to 
consensus in climate change interactions. 
This study uses the complexity driven by the two areas uncovered by Veal and Mouzas 
(2010) as the context in which interactions are and have to be made by organizational actors. 
Particularly, we aim to cut through this complexity by understanding how players get 
together in the game, to work together, to negotiate, to understand, and to listen. In order to 




The global nature and requirement of collective action to develop responses to climate 
change constructs a global network of stakeholders who care about the issue. The actors in 
this global climate change network include governments, international governance bodies, 
companies, non-governmental organizations, and research institutions (GlobeScan, 2006). 
Although all actors have a similar ability to influence the network, it needs to be considered 
that:  
Governments and international governance bodies have a high level of internal interaction and influence 
between actors, whereas companies, non-governmental organizations, and research organizations 
experience within their actor groups and hence influence each other less (Veal and Mouzas, 2010, p.424). 
Scholars seem not to have adequately addressed some of the most pressing questions about 
the appropriate responses to mitigate or adapt to climate change. Existing research on climate 
change has tended to focus on the operation of markets for carbon trading (e.g. Veal and 
Mouzas, 2011) and companies’ individual responses (e.g. Okereke, 2007). However, there is 
a deficiency of discussion about how companies’ as part of a wider network, may collectively 
respond (or not) to climate change. 
The prevalence and significance of this gap becomes apparent when considering repeated 
calls for more in-depth research in this area. For example, Brett and Kopelman (2004) see the 
social dilemma of contributing to stop climate change as a topic where further study is 
required. Moreover, Veal and Mouzas (2012) request studies on markets for environmental 
governance that examine how cognitive and behavioral biases affect political and economic 
behavior (Bazerman, 1984; Hardie and MacKenzie, 2007; Leiserowitz, 2006; Sunstein, 2006; 
Tversky and Kahneman, 1981, 1986). Despite the rich contribution of behavioral approaches 
to our understanding of systematic biases and human errors, questions remain about the 
inherent barriers impeding collective action in business networks. 
In order to account for the interdependence of actors, we adopt a network view on the 
activities of actors, rather than seeing them as individual and unitary (Welch and Wilkinson, 
2004). It is this empirical lens which unveils the barriers preventing consensus in climate 
change interactions from being reached. 
The network approach is used as a theoretical perspective to capture the ever increasing 
connectivity and interdependence in the business landscape. The network approach 
emphasizes that markets operate through complex institutional arrangements that enable 
exchange relationships amongst individually significant business actors (Easton and Araujo, 
1994; Lazonick, 1991; Mouzas, 2006). These exchanges are possible through a process of 
interaction (Easton and Håkansson, 1996; Håkansson, 1982; Turnbull and Valla, 1986). 
Companies depend on the resources and capabilities of other actors to operate their business 
(Easton and Håkansson, 1996; Gnyawali and Madhavan, 2001; Håkansson and Ford, 2002). 
As a result markets can be considered as an interdependent array of companies involved in 
frequent and complex interactions with other market participants (Håkansson and 
Waluszewski, 2002, 2007; Ritter, 2000). We argue that the global climate change initiatives 
are akin to this complex array of actors, as depicted within the business network theory 
literature; however, what we are interested in are the actual multi-lateral interactions which 






2.2 Barriers to collective action: The role of business interaction 
We aim to shed light on barriers against organizational level collective action in the case of 
climate change. In doing so, we suggest that we must first understand and highlight the 
underlying role of the process of business interaction and the barriers within, via the adoption 
of a business network approach. 
A business interaction can be described as a self-serving process that involves trade-offs 
between individually recognized and inter-dependent actors to address short and long-term 
problems (Ford and Håkansson, 2006; Ford and Mouzas, 2013). The process of interaction 
allows companies to enable resources and to attain short and long-term benefits (Ford and 
Mouzas, 2013).  
The resources of any business are interdependent and, therefore, do not operate in isolation. 
Physical, financial, human and technological resources of one actor are related to the 
respective resources of other actors (Ford and Håkansson, 2006). Through interaction these 
resources can be activated as counterparts to actors’ own resources. Actors become more 
interdependent due to co-evolving resources enabled through the process of interaction. 
Hereby, strong relationships are built and can act as a multiplier of internal resources (ibid). 
Although business interaction is a fundamental process within a networked business 
landscape, its understanding remains limited (Ford and Håkansson, 2006), particularly in the 
case of climate change (Veal and Mouzas, 2010). We posit that a number of barriers exist that 
hinder or impede business interactions. 
Firstly, interaction among businesses is driven and maintained for economic reasons 
(Håkansson, 1982). If economic rationality is absent, then business interaction is hindered. 
Secondly, interaction is a substantial process that involves the resources of counterparts. 
Financial resources (capital), physical resources (time, technologies, people) and 
informational resources (knowledge) are required to develop beneficial outcomes within 
interactions (Ford and Mouzas, 2010, 2013; Ritter and Gemünden, 2003). Thirdly, structure 
and design of rules of the game can influence the way that actors interact with each other 
(Felin et al., 2012; Veal and Mouzas, 2011). Nonetheless, business actors may elaborate 
responses that have an effect on the creation of new rules.  
 
3. Methods 
To investigate why companies fail to collectively respond to climate change, we engaged 
with relevant business actors in the public-private networks in Germany. More specifically, 
we attended a climate change panel discussion and conducted semi-structured interviews with 
stakeholders who made it clear by their participation that they care about climate change. 
This included representatives of a municipality (Mayor’s Office, Economic Development 
Council, Climate Change Protection Office, Climate Protection Agency, and Urban 
Development & Planning as well as an external advisor) and representatives of two 
companies (Environmental Officer and Head of Building & Property Management). Through 
this process of research engagement, we enabled the identification of processes that would 
have remained undiscovered in experiment based decision research. 
In this way, we respond to Wade-Benzoni et al. who suggest that “future research on 
institutional forces in ideologically based disputes is likely to be more fruitful if pursued in 
real-world conflicts” (2002, p.53). This methodological decision is supported by Yin’s (2003) 
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observation that field research is the appropriate research method to investigate a 
phenomenon in its real-life context. Investigating the behavior of business actors in networks 
of exchange relationships in Germany to mobilize collective action on climate change can be 
most suitably achieved through the case study research method (George and Bennett, 2005; 
Halinen and Törnroos, 2005; Perry, 1998; Yin, 2003). 
3.1 Data collection and analysis 
The data was collected between January and April 2015 through an empirical investigation of 
a public-private network initiated to develop collective responses to climate change. 
Furthermore, both companies are embedded in networks to exchange knowledge about 
responses to climate change (Figure 1 illustrates the actors’ interconnectedness within the 
public-private network). The empirical evidence was collected through a panel discussion (to 
provide a general overview of the interactions) and five semi-structured interviews with key 




Figure 1: The public-private network 
 
In the discussion section, we make several references to statements made by interviewees to 
support our arguments with empirical evidence. For clarity, we outline the network actor, the 




Network actor Name Role 
   
Greenock Harry Head of Building & Property Management 
Jack Fowler Oliver Environmental Officer 
Andor Amelia Mayor 
Andor Olivia Head of Economic Development 
Andor Sophie Head of Climate Protection Agency 
Andor Emily External Advisor 
Andor Jessica Head of Climate Protection Office 
Andor Jack Head of Urban Development & Planning Office 
Table 1: Network actors, names and roles 
 
Questions as part of the semi-structured interviews broadly included: 1) What are the climate 
protection activities conducted by your institution/company; 2) With whom do you interact 
and what is the context of these interactions?; 3) From your perspective, what are the interests 
and objectives of your counterparts?; 4) Do you remember any cases of disagreements during 
these interactions, if yes why and how did you overcome/solve them?. In line with the nature 
of semi-structured interviews, these questions aimed to cover some general areas of interest 
for the researchers and were slightly different in all interviews. The data sources have been 
logged in a library of case documents to capture all relevant material (Veal and Mouzas, 
2011). This process enabled handling multiple sources of evidence (Bennet and Elman, 2006; 
Numamgami, 1998). The data was collected with the aim of presenting a view of how 
businesses interact in response to climate change and what the reasons for the failed 
interaction in response to climate change are. 
The analysis of the evidence involved a process of confrontation between empirical 
observations and theoretical concepts (Ragin and Becker, 1992; Yin, 2003). More 
specifically, the evidence has been examined, categorized, tabulated, tested, or otherwise 
recombined to draw robust empirical conclusions (Yin, 2003). In its early stages, the data 
analysis involved interplay between observations logged in the library of case documents and 
the conceptual framework, allowing iterative changes to the cases (Yin, 2003). Moreover, we 
borrow heavily from Håkansson and Johanson’s (1992) ARA Model to develop our 
conceptual framework in order to reveal the process of interaction and the potential outcomes 
of it in relation to collective action.  
According to the ARA Model the outcomes of interactions can be described through actor 
bonds, activity links and resource ties between actors (Håkansson and Snehota, 1995).  
1. Actor bonds relate to interpersonal relationships between actors and the strength of 
actors bonds depends on 1) how actors see, know and feel close to each other; 2) how 
they trust, appreciate and influence each other and become mutually committed (Ford 
et al., 2008; see also Wilson and Jantrania, 1994; Wilkinson and Young, 1994; 
Huemer, 1998). Depending on the levels of these attributes, bonds between the actors 
will be weak/strong and may/may not influence the decisions of their counterparts 
(Ford et al., 2008). Moreover, actors appear to be an important factor when it comes 
to learning and teaching in relationships (Håkansson and Johanson, 2001). 
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2. Activity links relate to the integration and co-ordination of activities (e.g. production, 
logistics, administration, deliveries, information handling) between actors (Ford et al., 
2008). These more or less integrated and linked activities may lead to systematically 
similar and tightly linked behavior of companies (Richardson, 1972, Dubois, 1998). 
Depending on the strength, these links can have positive economic effects on the 
actors’ involved (Ford et al., 2008). 
3. Resource ties relate to “how the two actors’ resources may become more or less 
adapted and more or less mutually tied together as their interaction develops. Specific 
mutual adaptations may concern tangible resources such as physical items of plant or 
equipment, but may also include intangible resources such as knowledge” (Ford et al., 
2008, p.14). These resource ties are developed over time when actors adapt their 
resources (Hallen et al., 1991). 
Furthermore, an analytical rather than statistical logic is applied to generalize the findings 
(Easton, 2010). This is in line with the aim to move beyond econometric analysis, in order to 
capture the interaction processes, since these interaction processes require description and 
explanation (Veal and Mouzas, 2012).  
3.2 The Study: A public-private network to protect the climate 
This case study is based on the interactions with a public-private network designed to enable 
collective responses to climate change. Within this public-private network, we concentrate on 
three key actors (all names have been changed): Andor, the municipality itself, and the two 
largest multi-billion dollar manufacturers situated within it, Greenock, and Jack Fowler 
(Figure 1).  
Andor is a German city located within a metropolitan area in the south of Germany, with a 
population of over two million inhabitants. Size notwithstanding, Andor itself represents an 
interesting research case due to the high level of understanding of climate change from the 
majority of its 540 local companies. Indeed, in a recent study, over 90% of this total number 
affirmed that climate change and the environment were “important” (Panel Discussion, p.2, 
lines 12-21). However, and what is pertinent to this research paper, is the finding that only 
22% of firms in the municipality sponsored study had any form of environmental 
management system (EMS) in place, or even the beginnings of a strategic approach such as 
an environmental certificate.  
By way of historical context, Andor had been running a “most environmentally friendly 
company” competition for the prior five years, with Greenock and Jack Fowler jockeying for 
first and second place on an annual basis. Indeed, Andor itself had set a stringent goal of 
reducing CO2 emissions by a significant 40% by 2020, based on a benchmark level of 1990.  
Greenock is a manufacturer of metro, regional, suburban and high-speed trains, which also 
operates in the passenger transportation and signaling market. The company is one of the 
largest locomotive manufacturers with over 30,000 employees and operates worldwide. In 
addition to Greenock, the manufacturer Jack Fowler is part of the network. Jack Fowler is 
one of the largest producers of agricultural, construction and forestry machinery with over 
67,000 employees worldwide. Both Greenock and Jack Fowler make multi-billion US$ 
revenues annually and their operations have significant impact on the environment. As a 
response to the challenge of climate change they made the decision to enter into a climate 
protection cooperation with a city in which they both have manufacturing plants. 
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Immersing ourselves within a network which was actively focused on enabling collective 
action for climate change enabled a holistic understanding of the issues we sought to engage 
with, in terms of answering the “how” and the “why” questions outlined above. Indeed, it was 
clear to see that for Andor, as a lead member of this public-private network, the network itself 
was the key component to achieve this goal due to the significance of collaborative working 
from all the actors involved.  
Within each of the major actors within the network, there was a further level of what we 
would term a sub-network – constellations of 12 actors for both Greenock and Jack Fowler – 
which was created by the municipality to promote knowledge exchange on energy efficiency 
measures as part of organizational responses to climate change. The goal the municipality set 
for these sub-networks to create opportunities for individual company level responses to 
climate change. The actors of the sub-networks possess the freedom to give input in the 
network and to conduct projects based on the resources they are willing to provide. All actors 
take their role within the network seriously and are open to share their experiences. These 
sub-networks met on an ongoing basis, twice per year.  
After a period of three years Andor realized that knowledge exchange at the individual 
company level was not sufficient to reach their emissions reduction goal for 2020. As such, at 
this stage Andor instigated the design and implementation of the public-private network as a 
means to promote collective action. The actors in this network consisted of Greenock, Jack 
Fowler and the six municipality functions of Andor (Mayor’s Office, Economic Development 
Council, Climate Change Protection Office, Climate Protection Agency, and Urban 
Development & Planning as well as an external advisor). 
Andor’s interactions are executed by the mayor’s office, the economic development council, 
the climate protection agency, the climate protection office, the urban development and 
planning office as well as an external advisor from another municipality which forms the 
Andor network. Actors of the Andor network interact in a mutual dialogue to develop the 
municipalities’ climate protection strategy and measures. They are motivated by the joint 
goal of achieving the municipalities’ climate protection doctrine and CO2 reduction scenario 
for 2020. 
Actors within the Andor network have different roles but all have the common goal of CO2 
reduction at the core of their remit. The climate protection office is responsible for promoting 
climate protection projects and engages with all actors within the municipality to jointly 
reduce CO2 emissions. The urban development and planning office interacts with the mayor’s 
office to develop an urban landscape that promotes energy efficient buildings and ensures an 
air stream through the city that enables an acceptable climate in the city. The external advisor 
from another municipality provides examples of alternative approaches that have been 
implemented by their municipality. The climate protection agency is an office of the 
municipality to provide free and independent advice for citizens, the mayor’s office, 
businesses and all other actors within the municipality regarding climate protection. Lastly, 
the economic development council promotes the climate protection and outlines possibilities 
for governmental grants and support to move towards a low carbon municipality.  
The actors of the public-private network do not operate in isolation. Each actor is embedded 
in its own sub-network that influences its behavior and may lead to network effects. The 
actors within the public-private network are obliged to collectively respond to climate change 
by demonstrably reducing CO2 emissions and by conducting collective climate protection 
measures. All members of the public-private network are bound to provide an annual CO2 
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balance sheet to the municipality’s climate protection office. This is manifested in a contract 
signed by the senior mayor and by general managers of Greenock and Jack Fowler. 
All actors involved in the public-private network engage in give-and-take exchange 
relationships with other actors in the network to enable a collective approach to respond to 
climate change. The network can be described as a mechanism to achieve the municipalities’ 
climate protection doctrine and CO2 reduction scenario for 2020 by building a network of 
partners that communicate and exchange ideas to collectively respond to climate change. 
Here, the climate protection office is responsible for promoting climate protection projects 
within the network and to enable collaboration among all actors. Through knowledge 
exchange and utilization of synergies the network promotes self-commitment of multi-
national companies at the local level. Furthermore, a fair competition and mutual 
encouragement of climate protection measures is apparent between Greenock and Jack 
Fowler. As we can see, the public-private network is driven by a complex set of interactions 
due to the diverse, embedded, and interconnected groupings. 
3.3 Conceptual Framework 
Established from our understanding of the literature of collective action and interactions in 
business networks, and developed further from the case data, we present a conceptual 
framework to attempt to enable an understanding of the underlying processes that can lead to 
collective action or inaction (Figure 2). At the core of this iterative process of research (see 
for example Dubois and Gadde, 2002) is an attempt to understand the lack of collective 
organizational responses to the overarching challenge of climate change. In order to allow us 
to do this we apply an interactional perspective to the notion of collective action to tease out 
some of the ongoing processes and the barriers these interactions face which result in either 
collective action or inaction. In essence, we take a network perspective to answer the how and 
why questions outlined above. 
 
 
Figure 2: Conceptual framework 
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4. Analysis and discussion 
As outlined in the conceptual framework above, we aim at developing an understanding of 
how companies interact to craft collective responses to climate and why companies fail to do 
so. As such, our attention turns to a deeper analysis and discussion of the processes of 
interaction and crucially what we see as barriers to this and the resulting opportunity for 
collective action. 
We find the overarching barrier to collective responses to climate change is self-interest 
(Hardin, 1968). Indeed, if we analyze the case data we see that that the interests of each of the 
key actors in the public-private networks are different and driven by differing perspectives. 
From a series of detailed conversations with each of the actors in the public-private network, 
we summarized their quotes on their interests in Table 2 below. 
 
Network actor Key interests 
  
Greenock - to exchange ideas about which climate protection measure provides the biggest 
cost savings in the shortest time 
- to promote assistance measures offered by the municipality for the whole city and 
not only for a specific company 
- to develop a positive image within the municipality 




- to use the network as a driver for economic success 
- to increase efficiency of specific climate protection measures through interaction 
within the network 
- to exchange knowledge about which climate protection measure provides the 
biggest cost savings in the shortest time 
- to promote technology transfer with partner companies 
- to develop a positive image within the municipality 




- to exchange knowledge about climate change protection measures at the local 
level 
- to visualize role models within the municipality to promote resource conservation 
amongst all actors 
- to achieve the CO2 reduction goals for 2020 
- to develop an image of a climate protective municipality 
- to mobilize companies to get involved in climate protection and to sensitize 
companies for the climate protection goals of the municipality 






4.1 The multiplicity of interests as the key barrier to collective action 
All actors within the public-private network have joined the network based on diverging 
interests. As illustrated above, each actor is associated with a set of goals that can be similar 
or different to other actors. The incongruence in goals may even become a stronger barrier 
when further actors join the public-private network, thus invoking the arguments of scale and 
diversity of interest (Olson, 1982). Business networks – in their nature – are driven by 
multiparty interactions in which it is always more difficult to reach consensus due to 
multiplicity of interests. Climate protection measures that involve multiple parties are 
disproportionally more difficult to achieve. Here, the traditional behavioral decision theory 
argues that the incongruence in goals results in increased conflict, poorer communication, and 
reduced trust, less satisfaction and commitment, and negative views of other disputants 
(Gelfand et al., 2006). 
As the data above suggest, it is the inherent multiplicity of motivations of why they are part 
of the network and the differing and self-serving reasons of actors with regards to cost 
savings, image improvements or the protection of resources. These impede the process of 
interaction within and across the divergent actors within the network, leading to the potential 
of collective inaction. Below we present three sub-barriers that demonstrate the aggregation 
and significance of the multiplicity of interest which hinders the successful implementation of 
collective action. 
4.1.1 Sub-barrier I: Economic reasoning 
As interaction among businesses is driven and maintained for economic reasons (Håkansson, 
1982) and if this economic rationality is absent, then business interaction is hindered. 
Although we can see from the quotes below that Greenock’s participation in the network is 
driven by cost savings from the prospect of energy efficiency, this sentiment was not drawn 
from comments made by representatives of the municipality Andor who indeed were seen to 
be more far more driven by achieving their CO2 emissions reduction goal by 2020. 
Harry (Greenock): “Since we are a producing company, we are always looking for the additional € to save. 
So, it is not just climate change that drives us, but also the topic of cost savings through energy efficiency.” 
[Interview IV, p.1, lines 45-48] 
Oliver (Jack Fowler): “The investments always have to bring cost saving in the fastest possible time. I think 
it has to represent some kind of economic advantage in today’s competitive markets.” [Panel Discussion, 
p.4, lines 29-32] 
Amelia (Andor): “We have set ourselves an ambitious goal of reducing CO2 emissions by 40% by 2020 
based on the 1990 emissions. This is a good goal and we can achieve this together with the two companies. 
That why we have started this climate protection initiative.” [Panel Discussion, p.2, lines 22-25] 
Greenock and Jack Fowler are responding to climate change in a self-serving manner. It 
seems that they are only investing money, resources and time to interact within the network, 
when they expect that these interactions are financially or otherwise beneficial. This egoistic 
and financially beneficial driven behavior impedes collective responses to climate change 
since the most climate protective project might not be the most financially beneficial. Here, 
actors’ self-interests collide with collective interests which would include Andor. 
Consequently, developing collective climate protection measures can fail because of 
economically egoistic behavior of actors. This barrier is related to the issue of immediate 
costs that occur to respond to climate change and future benefits of climate protection 
measures. Therefore, network actors tend to focus on low-hanging fruits of immediate cost 
savings rather than tackling the climate change challenge where it might be most beneficial 
13 
 
for the environment in the longer run. This is in line with Veal and Mouzas’ (2010) argument 
that climate change mitigation is a rather unattractive solution since immediate costs incur to 
create benefits that are discounted by the time they can be taken into account. 
4.1.2 Sub-barrier II: Weak actor bonds 
The case data suggest that weak bonds exist among actors. Although Greenock and Jack 
Fowler do not find themselves competing at the product level, they tend to compete in a 
mutually respectful manner about who is the most environmentally responsible company 
within the municipality. 
Harry (Greenock): “We do compete to win the prize of the most environmentally friendly company within 
the region, but we do this in a fair manner.” [Interview IV, p.5, lines 10-13] 
Furthermore, the case data suggests that a certain degree of suspicion appears to exist in the 
municipality-company relationship. We argue that the suspicions between the municipality 
and the companies impede collective responses to climate change. Companies are often 
concerned about additional regulation and costs when the municipality approaches them 
regarding the topic of climate change. 
Emily (Andor): “The main obstacle is the barrier between companies and the municipality. When we, as the 
municipality, contacted the companies, they were always concerned about what the intentions of the city are 
and that we may want to impose additional requirements. It took us quite a while to convince them that we 
aim for a mutually respectful dialogue and that we do not want to impose additional requirements.” [Panel 
Discussion, p.9, lines 48-52] 
Hence, one may conclude that these suspicions and the weak bonds of all actors within the 
network lead to an inability of influencing the decisions of others in the network. This is 
supported by the feeling of independency of actors when developing climate protection 
measures. It appears that business actors’ hold a misguided perception that they possess the 
necessary resources and capabilities to develop a sufficient response to climate change as 
individual company. 
Harry (Greenock): “We are definitely not dependent on the municipality or anyone in the sense that we 
cannot implement cost-saving or energy efficiency measures. We are certainly not and we do not feel that we 
are dependent on the municipality.” [Interview IV, p.3, lines 33-36] 
Emily (Andor): “I do not think that the companies depend on each other. Developing cross-company 
solutions is very difficult. The easiest solutions are the internal approaches and there are many set screws. 
They will not save the world, but if everybody contributes a little bit then we already made a big step 
forward.” [Interview IV, p.2-3, lines 51-2] 
Although the independency of actors may not hinder the development of individual measures 
in response to climate change, it may contribute to weaker interpersonal relationships within 
the network. Consequently, companies may fail to collectively respond to climate change.  
4.1.3 Sub-barrier III: Differing perceptions of the rules of the game 
Structure and the design of rules of the game can influence the way that actors interact with 
each other (Felin et al., 2012; Veal and Mouzas, 2011). As the quotes below suggest, across 
the three network actors, they each held different perspectives on what the actual aim of the 
network was.  
Amelia (Andor): “It is important for us to reduce CO2 emissions through the implementation of the climate 
protection network.“ [Panel Discussion, p.8, lines 6-7] 
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Oliver (Jack Fowler): “Our expectation of the climate protection network is to use it as a forum that allows 
us to exchange ideas about climate protection measures. […] This is supposed to contribute to reach our 
own climate protection goals.” [Panel Discussion, p.10, lines 17-25] 
The diverging perceptions of the public-private network impede collective responses to 
climate change. Those individuals spoken to within Andor perceived the public-private 
network as a place of congruent goals and interdependency which is supposed to lead to 
collective action in response to climate change. On the other hand, actors within the 
Greenock and Jack Fowler perceived it as a place of incongruent goals and independency. 
Consequently, actors tend to focus on individual responses, whilst failing to collectively 
respond to climate change. Again, this suggests the negative impact of differing perspective 
of actors when attempting to craft collective action (Olson, 1982). 
 
5. Conclusion and implications 
This study was conducted to explore how companies interact in response to climate and why 
companies fail to collectively respond to climate change. We argued that similarities can exist 
in terms of the barriers against both collective action and interaction such as scale, diversity 
of interest and the differing perspective of actors (Olson, 1982) which are inherent in larger 
collectives or networks. Therefore, we applied a theoretical perspective drawn from the 
business network literature in order to unveil why collective action does not happen in 
organizational networks. At the core of this – via the detailed analysis of a public-private 
network – we identified a set of barriers which, when aggregated, negatively impeded the 
process of crafting collective action in response to climate change. 
This study suggests that the multiplicity of interests is the overarching reason why collective 
action is impeded. As illustrated above, each actor is associated with a set of goals that can be 
similar or different to other actors. When actors’ goals are incongruent (as illustrated in this 
case) then reaching consensus on collective climate protection measures is hindered. Here, 
the traditional behavioral theory states that this incongruence in goals may result in increased 
conflict, poorer communication, and reduced trust, less satisfaction and commitment, and 
negative views of other actors (Gelfand et al., 2006). The inherent multiplicity of motivations 
of why actors are part of a network combined with the differing self-serving reasons of actors 
with regards to cost savings, image improvements or the protection of resources may be 
argued to hinder the process of interaction within, and across the divergent actors within the 
network, leading to the potential of collective inaction.  
The multiplicity of interests is aggravated by three sub-barriers that hinder the successful 
implementation of collective action: 
1) Economic reasoning: The interaction among businesses is inherently driven and 
maintained for economic reasons (Håkansson, 1982). Prior research suggests it seems 
companies only invest finances, resources and time to interact within the network, 
when they expect that these interactions are financially or otherwise beneficial. 
However, actors’ self-interests can collide with collective interests which would 
include wider societal groupings. Therefore, crafting a collective response to climate 
change can fail because of economically egoistic behavior of actors. 
2) Weak actor bonds: Companies are often concerned about additional regulation and 
costs when being approached by municipalities regarding the topic of climate change. 
It appears that business actors are suspicious about the intrinsic motivations of the 
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municipality. This is amplified by a feeling of independency among actors when 
developing climate protection measures. This may also be attributed to business 
managers’ misguided perception that they have the necessary resources and 
capabilities to craft a sufficient response to the global challenge of climate change as 
individual actors. The suspicions and independent nature of actors promote the 
development of individual measures in response to climate change. Consequently, 
network actors may fail to collectively respond to climate change. 
3) Differing perceptions of the rules of the game: The structure and design of rules of the 
game can influence the way that actors interact with each other (Felin et al., 2012; 
Veal and Mouzas, 2011). It appears that diverging perspectives on what the actual aim 
of the public-private network is impeded collective responses to climate change. 
Whereas the municipality perceived the public-private network as a place of 
congruent goals and interdependency, both companies perceived its goals as 
incongruent goals and its actors as independent. The negative impact of diverging 
perspectives of actors involved in the network impedes the endeavor of crafting 
collective responses to climate change. 
In an attempt to overcome the barriers presented above one may suggest that a fundamental 
shift from self-interested and financially driven behavior of actors is necessary to allow the 
development of sufficient measures to tackle the global challenge of climate change.  
However, from our analysis of the data, we posit that this is a highly unlikely scenario as it 
stands. We argue that if firms and organizations intend to develop collective responses to 
climate change, it is a prerequisite for these firms to have a clear understanding of what the 
goals, motivations and interests of each organizational actor involved are. We suggest that by 
taking actors’ financial, economic and altruistic notions into account when designing 
networks for collective action, the multiplicity of interests among actors can be downscaled. 
Therefore, we conclude that the resulting congruence of goals, motivations and interests of 
each organizational actor would enable the success of collective action and reduce the 
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